For nearly half a century after his stint as Nigeria’s
military leader, Murtala Muhammed remained widely
regarded as a dogged corruption fighter who took
fearless steps against official graft.
As head of state, the army general dismissed more than
10, 000 public officials, charged many to court for
malpractices, and moved against fraudulent firms.
Mr. Muhammed’s administration lasted six months
before his assassination, but was long enough to
convince many the 37-year-old was one leader who
could have aggressively treated – if not cured – Nigeria
of its chronic corruption, had he lived longer.
But to American diplomats, Mr. Muhammed was a
strikingly different figure from the no-nonsense general
many Nigerians respected.
They believed he was not only an arrogant mass
murderer, but just as corrupt as those he went after.
And, although brilliant and daring, Mr. Muhammed was
an erratic and impetuous ethnic chauvinist who lacked
the unifying talent of his predecessor, Yakubu Gowon,
American diplomats said at the time.
John E. Reinhardt, former US ambassador to Nigeria.
John E. Reinhardt, former US ambassador to Nigeria.
“The leader of the coup against General Yakubu Gowon
is an erratic, vainglorious, impetuous, corrupt, vindictive,
intelligent, articulate, daring Hausa,” a memorandum
sent by then American Ambassador to Nigeria, John
Reinhardt, to then United States Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger, on August 18, 1975, said.
The memo, amongst several recently declassified U.S.
diplomatic cables, painted a sordid picture of a man
regarded by many Nigerians as a folk hero of sort, for
his seeming relentless war against corruption.
Mr. Reinhardt delivered the damning appraisal on the
request of Mr. Kissinger shortly after Mr. Muhammed
deposed Mr. Gowon in a coup d’état.
The change of guard apparently triggered a feverish
effort by the American government to obtain the
character portraits of the new coup leaders of Africa’s
most populous nation.
“Brigadier Murtala Muhammed was a prime force in the
Nigerian coup of July 1966, which brought Gowon to
power, and is one of the two principal plotters against
Gowon for the past two years,” Mr. Reinhardt wrote.
“He commanded a division during the Nigerian civil war,
was involved in the only documented case of genocide,
won one important battle, and thereafter coasted for
upwards of two years until Gowon finally removed him
from command and placed him in charge of Army
signals, a position which he held until last month…
coup.”
While Mr. Muhammed led Nigeria for less than a year
before being overthrown, he featured for about a
decade in the realms of military and political power.
He was also controversial. During the war against the
secessionist Biafra Republic, Mr. Muhammed
commanded the army’s second division which was
accused of executing thousands of civilians in Asaba,
Delta State, in what is now known as the Asaba
Massacre.
The division was also accused of ordering the killing of
several Biafran prisoners of war.
After he took office in 1975, Mr. Muhammed moved
fiercely against corruption, earning praise.
But the U.S. cable depicted him differently.
One letter to Washington says Mr. Muhammed inherited
from Mr. Gowon – and also contributed to – a “tradition
of corrupt civilian and military officials, urban problems
second only to those of Calcutta, drift and ineptitude in
development, insoluble but containable ethnic problems,
and a national temperament which combines pride,
aggressiveness, arrogance and patriotism into a brand
of xenophobia best labeled Nigerianism”.
“Almost six years after the civil war, Muhammed is
probably ushering in a period of coups,” the cable said.
“As a corrupt Hausa, he automatically attracts Ibo and
Yoruba enmity, which he knows and has attempted to
reduce by early appointments. As a Northerner and a
Muslim, he will be expected to consolidate once and
for all the leadership role which his fifty million brothers
are certain is theirs. Muhammed will agree, of course,
but will seem to the Hausas to vacillate as he sings
‘One Nigeria’.”
The Murtala Mohammed Foundation did not respond to
a request for comment. Mr. Muhammed’s daughter,
Aisha Muhammed-Oyebode, who heads the foundation,
could not be reached. Calls and a text message to her
phone were not answered.
Balaraba Ramat Yakubu, author and younger sister of
the former head of state, said she was not in a position
to respond. She advised we contact the foundation’s
head office in Lagos. Calls to available numbers to the
office did not go through.
Michael Ogbeidi, professor and head of department of
History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos, who
has researched and written extensively on political
leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960, said he
rejected the American assessment.
“America should put its house in order first and stop
acting as the most honest nation in the world,” Mr.
Ogbeidi said.
He said Mr. Reinhardt spoke “un-ambassadorially”, and
suggested the Americans may have been unhappy with
Mr. Murtala because of his tough stance against
“corrupt” American companies that violated Nigerian
laws.
“I completely disagree with that assessment because no
country houses corrupt business entities like the USA;
and this is evidenced in the collapse of the country’s
housing, mortgage and auto sectors,” he said.
Eric Teniola, a veteran journalist, who was the Oyo
State Bureau Chief for the Nigerian Herald at the time,
also disagreed with the Americans.
“I am unable to agree with the Americans that he was
corrupt because although there were lots of allegations
at the time, they were never proven,” Mr. Teniola said.
As far as I am concerned, he was a brave and
committed administrator, never afraid of taking tough
decisions and then standing firmly by them. He was a
straightforward man. He was never sly.
“But it is true that he has high temper and was not
much of a team player. He also displayed indiscipline in
the way he related with Gowon during the war.”
Mr. Reinhardt, who was the U.S. top diplomat to Nigeria
from 1971 to 1975, said while there was no reason to
believe that Mr. Murtala could approach Mr. Gowon’s
success in accommodating ethnic rivalries, there was
also no reason to think that he would be any more
successful in rapidly developing the country.
“…And rapidity is the great need if he is to avoid
Gowon’s political problems stemming from stymied
development,” he said. “Money is obviously plentiful,
but absorptive capacity is low (corruption, unrealistic
planning, confused priorities, and a demonstrated
reluctance to turn to the outside).”
The cable had fewer words about Mr. Obasanjo, who
later succeeded Mr. Muhammed after his death, and
would later become Nigeria’s civilian president.
12 Oct 1977, Manhattan, New York, USA: Lt. General
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria addressing the United
Nations. [Photo Credit: CORBIS]
12 Oct 1977, Manhattan, New York, USA: Lt. General
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria addressing the United
Nations. [Photo Credit: CORBIS]
It pointed to the duo’s activism against apartheid in
Southern Africa, and suspected they were anti-
American.
“Finally, Muhammed and his co-plotter and now deputy,
Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, are the most militant of
Nigerian military leaders on the Southern African
question. Gowon and his principal lieutenants burned
with the rage of all Africans when considering this
issue, but they were realistic,” he said.
“Muhammed and Obasanjo are advocates of a NATO-
type military command within the OAU having the
avowed objective of strengthening liberation
movements. More responsibility may bring more
realism. On the other hand, formidable ethnic and
developmental problems could convince the new
leadership that they should deal repressively with the
domestic scene while joining militant Arabs and
Africans in organizing a Pan African jihad for liberation.
(A large Libyan delegation visited Lagos last week.)
Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo on 31
July,1975, a day after taking office. [Photo credit:
Nigerian Bulletin]
Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo on 31
July,1975, a day after taking office. [Photo credit:
Nigerian Bulletin]
“Muhammed and Obasanjo are unlikely to bring any
more inspiration to this enterprise than Nkrumah and
Amin. At any rate they do not enhance their prospects
for survival by any launchings on this uncharted course.
Yorubas and Ibos, at least, will be disinclined to travel
with them.”
Mr. Reinhardt said an early but “undocumented and
probably inaccurate assessment” was that certainly Mr.
Muhammed and perhaps Mr. Obasanjo were anti-
American. He said that reaction was based on “an
unfortunate U.S. visa restriction entered in
Muhammed’s passport and Obasanjo’s impulsive move
to evict our Embassy from prime Lagos property.”
“We are simply too far apart on the political issues
which they exalt, mainly Southern Africa and the whole
range of UN controversies,” he said.
He said the U.S. stood greater chance in the economic-
commercial area, and noted that Mr. Muhammed had
demonstrated some responsiveness in that regard.
“When the corrupt Muhammed succeeded the more
corrupt J. S. Tarka as Commissioner of
Communications, he immediately perceived that at least
the telephones must operate properly if his fate were to
be any different from Tarka’s.
“American businessmen, in extended conversations
with me, described Muhammed as being un-Nigerian in
his acceptance of their proposals.
Specifically GTE and
ITT were close to multi-million dollar contracts when
Muhammed turned from communications to plotting.”
He assessed that Mr. Muhammed was intelligent
enough to realise that he could not survive unless he
converted oil revenues into tangible development.
“Among his considerable faults is not Idi Arminian
stupidity,” he wrote. “His questionable maneuverings as
Commissioner reveal a respect for American
technology and a realization that capital markets do not
begin and end in London. (British and Canadian
communications interests have absorbed Nigerian
revenues for years without producing a workable
system. Other fields point up similar examples, as USG
(Unites States Government) policy has deferred to a
British sphere of influence.)
Amongst the recommendations Mr. Reinhardt sent to
Washington, was an advice that the U.S. avoid even
semblance of close political ties to the new regime,
“until and unless it proves more durable than now
seems likely”.
Former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon
Former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon
On the contrary, he advised the American government
to maintain discreet and friendly state ties with Mr.
Gowon, though avoiding commitments.
“After another coup or two, probably bloody, Gowon
may seem more and more to be the indispensable
military leader, or at least the only acceptable one,” he
concluded.
Mr. Reinhardt was the first black U.S. ambassador to
Nigeria. In 1977, he became the first career diplomat to
lead the U.S. Information Agency.
He died on February 18, 2016 at 95.
